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1.  Introduction 
 
  Credit  derivatives  are  the  latest 
tools in the management of the credit risk 
portfolio.  Credit derivatives have grown 
considerably  because  they  provide  an 
effective mechanism for the exchange of 
credit risk. While modern banking is built 
on  the  sensible  notion  that  a  loan 
portfolio  is less risky than a single  one, 
banks  still  tend  to  focus  too  much 
geographically  or  in  certain  sectors: 
industrial, commercial or financial.   
  An  example  could  be  the  credit 
default swap contracts (CDS).  
  Credit  default  swap  is  a  swap 
that  transfers  the  potential  loss  of  the 
reserve  assets  by  the  occurrence  of 
events  related  to  the  counterparty 
(bankruptcy,  failure  to  pay  debts, 
insolvency,  lower  credit  ratings).    The 
bond  is  the  favourite  reference  asset, 
because  it  has  advantages  in  terms  of 
price  transparency  and  the  relation 
between itself and the debtor's state. Due 
to  the  large  volume  of  credit  swap 
contracts  undertaken,  loans  tend  to  be 
the main asset of reference because they 
represent  the  majority  of  the  interest 
bearing assets from a bank.  
  In a credit default swap contract, 
a protection buyer pays a premium to a 
protection seller, in exchange for further 
amounts,  if  the  credit  is  granted.    The 
premium  may  be  paid  initially,  with  one 
installment  or  periodically.    Contingent 
payment is based on a credit event.  
  The  purchaser  of  a  bond  can 
enter  a  cover  operation  for  default  risk 
and in this regard CDS can be seen as a 
credit  insurance.    A  credit  insurance  is 
not  subject  to  regulations  concerning 
insurance market. An investor can buy or 
sell  protection  without  having  a  debt  of 
the underlying asset.  
  This  article  aims  to  present  the 
overall  market  for  credit  default  swaps 
and  their  regulatory  trends  worldwide.  
Over the past year and a half, the states’ 
interest  for  CDS  contracts  has  grown 
significantly, due to the global crisis and 
especially  to  the  speculations  on 
sovereign  risks.  If  for  ten  years  the 
regulatory  discussions  on  credit 
derivatives market were only theoretical, 
the  current  period  showed  that  a 
postponement  of  regulations  may 
destabilize the country's efforts to get out 
of  recession.  The  most  important 
question  is  whether  CDS  should  be 
forbidden  or  properly  regulated.    The 
study  of  these  derivatives  or  their 
overregulation  won’t  solve  the  particular 
risks across borders.  More important, I 
think it is the commitment of the states to 
set  up  a  regulated  and  transparent 
market for credit derivatives.  The role of 
the  CDS  contracts  is  to  identify  and 
quantify the risks. 
  
2. Risks which affect the CDS world 
market 
 
  The  first  identified  global  issue 
was that of counterparty risk. In terms of 
profit credit, the default swap contract, at 
a level system, is a zero sum game.  This 
is  because  only  one  of  the  two 
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participants can record a profit from such 
a contract.  The risk of not being able to 
complete  the  contract  according  to  the 
agreement,  could  generate  losses  for 
both parties. This counterparty risk exists 
because the credit default swap contracts 
are carried on over the counter market, 
which makes a contract uncertain till the 
date  of  payment.    The  global  economic 
situation  has  generated  an  increased 
counterparty risk in a market that reaches 
a level of trillions of dollars.  
  Counterparty risk  
  Since  a  CDS  contract  has  a 
value  which  starts  at  U.S.  $  10  million, 
the  counterparty  risk  can  become  a 
systemic  risk  in  tensed  situation,  on 
international  financial  markets.  
Regulators  in  the  U.S.  and  EU  have 
identified this problem since the day they 
begun  to  manifest  the  symptoms  of  the 
global  crisis.    However,  no  action  was 
taken,  and  now  the  credit  default  swap 
contracts threaten the construction of the 
European currency, through speculations 
on  sovereign  risks  of  several  European 
countries.  
  A solution to this problem may be 
the creation of a Clearing House, so that 
transactions could be developed, having 
as a counterparty this institution, which is 
specific to the regulated capital markets.  
Aiming  towards  the  implementation  of 
this  system,  DTCC  has  began  the 
accreditation  operations  of  an  entity, 
financially  and  logistically  capable,  and 
able to take over this function.  
  Concentration risk 
  This  risk  is  evident  when 
considering the number of dealers for the 
CDS  market.    2008  is  the  last  year  for 
which  we  have  complete  data;  the 
present situation tells us that we should 
focus on five major dealers: JP Morgan, 
Goldman Sachs Group, Morgan Stanley, 
Deutsche  Bank,  Barclays  group.    From 
the  preliminary  data  for  2009,  we  can  
conclude  that  the  situation  remains  the 
same.  An important aspect related to the 
sovereign  debt  crisis  refers  to  the  big 
players  on  the  CDS  market,  which  are 
banks  that  have  received  substantial 
financial packages from the governments 
of  the  mother  countries.    The 
governments  have  saved  the  banking 
systems  and  as  we  speak,  large 
corporations  speculate  the  financial 
"collapse of the national economies”.  
  Interconnection risk 
  CDS contracts have proved to be 
a growth factor for the interdependencies 
from the banking system.  After studying 
the effects of the current economic crisis 
on  the  credit  default  swap  contracts’ 
market  we  can  identify  three  issues 
related  to  the  macroeconomic 
interconnections.  
  A  first  aspect  is  that  of  the 
underlying  assets  belonging  to  the 
banking  system.  Since  banks  are  the 
main  intermediaries,  as  shown  in  the 
previous  paragraph,  and  because 
system-level  problems may  spread  very 
easily, the CDS contract risk is very close 
to  the  counterparty  risk.  This  way,  the 
investors find very hard to estimate this 
risk.  That’s why some of the regulatory 
authorities  prohibit  such  credit  default 
swap transactions.  
  The second aspect  is related to 
the  sovereign  risk  and  to  the  banking 
shares which tend to speculate the public 
deficits,  after  they  are  financially 
supported  by  the  governments.    I 
mentioned  this  aspect  in  the  previous 
paragraph, because besides the aspects 
related  to  ethic,  the  deterioration  of  the 
country  risk  negatively  influences  the 
banking  activity.    The  increasing 
correlation between the underlying asset 
market and the protection sellers through 
CDS,  reduces  the  risk  of  transmission 
efficiency  and  therefore  the  effect  of 
hedging transactions.  This risk is called 
"wrong-way  risk"  and  occurs  when  an 
entity  or  more  are  affected  by  the  link 
between  the  credit  quality  and  the 
partner’s capacity (from the credit default 
swap transaction) to make the payment.  
One  way  to  identify  this  risk  is  to  use 
stress  tests  within  the  banking 
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  The  third  issue  concerns  the 
links between participants. Such an entity 
which does not have a significant weight 
in the system, can generate a significant 
systemic  risk,  because  of  its  size  and 
because  of  the  type  of  the  transactions 
conducted  through.  An  important 
example  would  be  the  AIG  case,  an 
entity  which  held  the  20th  international 
position  among  the  participants  on  the 
credit  default  swap  market  and  had  a 
gross exposure of only 10% of the largest 
participant’s  exposure  on  this  market.  
However,  the  company's  size  and  the 
fact  that  it  did  not  carry  out  coverage 
operations  for  the  CDS  contracts,  has 
forced  the  U.S.  government  to  interfere 
and  to  support  the  company  financially, 
because  the  financial  system  wouldn’t 
have survived to such a shock.  
Straight through processing 
   This  issue  was  identified  by  the 
International Bank of Settlement following 
the reports received from various national 
authorities. This situation was noticed in 
practice  when  many  operators  on  CDS 
market have not been able to record the 
CDS  contracts  settled  during  the  same 
working day.   This is a  very dangerous 
situation  as  the  participants  on  the 
market may not know exactly which are 
the  related  risks.  In  order  to  solve  this 
fact,  the  Bank  for  International 
Settlements  has  proposed  for  each 
participant  on  the  CDS  market  to 
introduce a standard   procedure,  based 
on  automated  computer  operations. 
Using  such  a  system  requires 
investments  both  for  the  participants  in 
order  to  be  able  to  manage  automated 
transactions  and  also  for  the  new 
international  institutions  which  will 
regulate  and  control  the  market.  At  the 
international level it is necessary to take 
to a new level of standardization the CDS 
contracts  for  a  better  evidence  of  the 
contracts.  
   Lack of transparency risk  
   Credit  default  swap  market  is 
characterized  by  a  worrying  lack  of 
transparency  both  for  participants  and 
also for the authorities from all countries.  
Since  the  size  of  the  credit  derivatives 
market  exceeds  the  global  gross 
domestic product, it is a worrying fact that 
the  price  is  not  formed  in  a  clear  way.  
This lack of transparency is given by the 
fact  that  over  the  counter  markets  to 
price  is  formed  by  direct  negotiation 
between the two trading participants.  
 Lack of consistent regulation  
  There are no credit default swap 
market regulations both at a national and 
international  level.  This  is  indeed  the 
Gordian  knot  of  CDS  transactions.  
Innovation in the market was more rapid 
than  the  ability  and  willingness  of  the 
States  to  create  the  institutional 
framework  for  the  new  occurred 
transactions.    As  we  cannot  conclude 
that  a  car  itself  is  quite  dangerous, 
following the same logical way we cannot 
say  that  the  use  of  CDS  contracts 
generates  serious  problems 
internationally, but it is obviously that the 
lack  of  adequate  regulatory  framework 
does  that.    A  more  clear  matter  that 
arises  is  the  lack  of  international 
engagement in order to regulate the use 
of credit derivatives in general.  From my 
point of view this lack of real action has 
two causes.  The first cause may be the 
inability  of  current  national  and 
international  structures  to  mobilize 
themselves in more vigorous actions for 
control  and  crisis  prevention.    This 
assertion is supported by  the incapacity 
of the central banking system to predict 
this  current  crisis  and  to  find  internal 
resources  in  order  to  solve  the  chronic 
problems which appeared in the banking 
system.    The  second  question  may  be 
the  lobbying  system  created  by  the 
international  financial  community,  lobby 
which is very influent in the political area.  
This  assertion  is  supported  by  the 
observation  that  politicians,  in 
industrialized countries have focused on 
helping  the  banking  system  and  not  on 
restructuring it.  If for the first moments of 
the  global  crisis,  the  helping  programs 
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nearly  two  years  from  the  beginning  of 
the  crisis,  restructuring  and  adapting  to 
the  new  realities  ought  to  be  strongly 
supported  and  not  maintained  at  a 
declarative level. From this point of view I 
consider  that  the  current  situation  with 
speculations on the public debt defaults 
from  several  EU  countries  cannot  be 
charged  on  the  behalf  of  the  financial 
banking system, as the first intention was 
to hedge the exposure on that countries, 
and after that it was the pursuit of a legal 
and  logical  yield.    Responsible  for  the 
present  situation  are  those  who  have 
administered  these  countries,  e.g. 
Greece  authorities,  who  forged  over 
many  years the statistics about the real 
macroeconomic situation, and not those 
who speculated on public debt default in 
order to obtain a profit. 
  
 3. Credit default swap market by the 
end of 2009 
 
  CDS  market  information  is 
published  by  three  international 
institutions.  These  are  the  Bank  for 
International  Settlements  (BIS), 
International  Swaps  and  Derivatives 
Association  (ISDA)  and  The  Depository 
Trust  &  Clearing  Corporation  (DTCC).  
Figures  published  by  these  three 
international bodies are not identical and 
therefore  they  could  generate  confusion 
because  of  the  differences  between 
them.    The  explanation  for  these 
differences  is  given  by  the  number  of 
operators  which  report  the  CDS 
transactions to each of these three major 
institutions.    Among  them,  the  most 
accurate values belong to ISDA and BIS, 
as their statistics include global contracts 
and  agreements,  not  just  their  own 
contracts, as DTCC does.  
  Global volume of CDS at the end 
of  December  2009,  according  to  the 
figures  published  by  BIS,  is  30.4  trillion 
dollars.  For the same period the volume 
of global exchange capitalization is U.S. 
$  444  trillion,  according  to  the  data 
published by BIS.  
  Gross  market  value  in 
December  2009  was  1.8  trillion  dollars. 
This  is  the  amount  which  participants 
take into account if they have to replace 
current contracts.  This amount is much 
smaller  than  the  total  volume  of  30.4 
trillion  dollars  of  CDS.  The  analysis  of 
these figures proves us the fact that the 
danger of CDS is highly exacerbated as 
the  real  payment  for  CDS  contracts 
would be only a part of the insured sum.  
For  example,  in  the  case  of  Lehman 
Brothers, for the auction made by ISDA 
was paid a contribution of 8.625% of the 
contracts.  This percentage represented 
the  value  of  the  actual  losses  by  those 
who  had  exposure  to  that  bank.
 
       Figure 1 (US Dollars trillion) 
 
Source: www.bis.org; www.isda.org    
 
According  to  data  published  by 
ISDA, we notice that the CDS market has 
evolved  a  lot  between  2001  and  2007; 
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authorities  didn’t  see  the  potential 








The  value  of  derivative  contracts 
concluded on the OTC markets in 2009 
was  U.S.  $  614.7  trillion.    From  this 
amount the largest share was the interest 
rate  contracts,  with  a  value  of  U.S.  $ 
449.8  trillion.    Compared  to  these 
amounts,  the  32.7  trillion  dollars  of  the 
CDS contracts represent only 5% of the 







  Following  the  analyzed  figures 
and  the  theoretical  observations  on  the 
development  of  CDS  contracts,  I  may 
conclude  that  these  contracts  show  the 
fear  of  the  investors  regarding  the 
possible  credit  default.  The  problems 
which  arose  from  trading  this  kind  of 
credit  derivatives,  are  inherent  and  I 
consider  that  it  is  the  states’  duty  to 
implement  the  lines  between  legal  and 
illegal.  I think the question is wrongly put 
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states  have  reached  the  limit  situations 
because  of  the  actions  of  the 
speculators.  The  problems  were  fueled 
by  the  speculative  actions,  but  they 
weren’t generated by them.  Practically, 
the  inability  of  the  States  to  reorganize 
themselves  under  the  pressure  of  the 
global  crisis,  has  generated  and  also 
increased  the  tensions  in  the  CDS 
market,  regarding  the  possibility  of  the 
public debt default.  Also, the slowness of 
the  regulatory  process  for  OTC 
derivatives  allowed  the  participants  on 
CDS  markets  to  exploit  the  system 
weaknesses  (e.g.  no  clearing  houses, 
ambiguous price formation, etc.).   From 
my point of view a regulatory action will 
eliminate the problems mentioned during 
the  article  and  the  CDS  market  will  be 
more fair and transparent. 
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